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2 Abbreviations and glossary 
 
CGT Capital gains tax 
CSARS Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service 
DTA / tax treaty Double Tax Agreement / Double Tax 
Convention 
ITA Income Tax Act No.58 of 1962 (as 
amended) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
OECD Commentary Commentary on the OECD Model on 
Income and on Capital 
OECD Model  OECD Model Tax Convention 
1991 Minerals Act Minerals Act No.50 of 1991, as 
amended 
Mineral right  Encompasses a prospecting right and a 
mining right in respect of mining 
activities and an exploration right and 
production right in respect of oil and 
gas activities 
Minister Minister of Minerals and Energy 
MPRDA Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act No. 28 of 2002, as 
amended 
Republic/South Africa South Africa 
SARS South African Revenue Service 









3.1 Background  
South Africa’s extraordinary mineral wealth has been the driving force of the 
economy for decades. The world’s largest reserves of gold, chrome, manganese 
and Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) can be found in the country1 so it is little 
wonder that foreign investors, since the first documented search for minerals in 
1654 began2, continue to explore the length and breadth of the country in order 
to capitalise on the opportunities presented by the abundance of natural 
resources available in South Africa. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into South Africa between 2011 and 
2012, however, decreased by 24 per cent,
3
 according to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The main reason attributed 
for the decline in FDI during that period has been cited by UNCTAD to be due 
to a foreign mining company disposing of its shares in a local subsidiary. The 
trend of divestment by multinationals of their South African mining assets in 
recent times has commentators pointing to the lack of certainty regarding mining 




In his 2013/14 Budget Speech, the Minister of Finance announced that the 
mining tax regime in South Africa will be assessed in a broader review of the 
tax system.
5
 To this end, the Davis Tax Committee (the Committee) has been 
established under the chair of Judge Dennis Davis. The Committee’s terms of 
                                                     
1 Sourced from the Pocket Guide to South Africa 2012/13. Online at: 
http://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/www.gcis.gov.za/files/docs/resourcecentre/pocketguide/2012/15per 
cent20Mineralper cent20Resources.pdf on 26 January 2014 
2 Sourced from Mining Weekly. Online at: http://www.miningweekly.com/article/van-riebeeck-and-sas-
first-documented-search-for-minerals-2009-11-20 on 26 May 2013 
3 Sourced from Money Web, “Foreign direct investment into SA down 24per cent”, published on 27 June 
2013. Online at: http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-economic-trends/foreign-direct-investment-into-
sa-down-24 on 27 June 2013. 
4 Sourced from Mining Weekly. Online at http://www.miningweekly.com/article/sa-mining-laws-impact-
on-foreign-investment-2011-02-11 on 26 January 2014 
5 2013 Budget Review, Chapter 4, Revenue Trends and tax proposals, Page 56 
 
 




reference include consideration as to whether the current mining tax regime is 
appropriate, taking account of, inter alia the external challenges facing the 
mining sector as well as the agreement between the State, labour and business to 




The 2013 Tax Statistics released by National Treasury paints a picture of the 
decline in taxes collected from mining companies over the past 5 years. In 2009, 
11.1 per cent of total tax assessed was from the mining sector. By contrast, in 
2012, only 4.3 per cent of total tax assessed came from the same sector.
7
 
Against this backdrop, the tax consulting environment in South Africa has seen 
a number of multinational companies seeking tax advice, not only with regard to 
acquiring South African mining assets through favourable tax jurisdictions, but 
increasingly, with regard to the tax treatment of their investments upon future 
withdrawal from South Africa.    
3.2 Scope and purpose of research  
This research paper analyses the income tax impact for international (non-
resident) companies that dispose of their shares in mining or oil and gas 
companies situated in South Africa. 
Typically, a disposal of shares by a non-resident in a property-rich company in 
South Africa would attract CGT. In the case of the minerals sector, it is 
automatically assumed that a mining or oil and gas company is a so-called 
“land-rich” or “property-rich” company due to the nature of its operations. This 
paper seeks to test that assumption, ie do shares in a mining or oil gas company 
whose only asset is a mining or prospecting right or exploration or production 
                                                     
6 Sourced from The Davis Tax Committee website Online at: www.taxcom.org.za on 23 November 2013 
7 Sourced from the 2013 Tax Statistics published jointly by National Treasury and SARS, dated 21 October 
2013. Online at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/taxper cent20statistics/2013/TStatsper 
cent202013per cent20WEB.pdf on 26 January 2014 
 
 




right respectively qualify as an ‘interest in immovable property’ as that term is 
defined in the ITA for CGT purposes?  
To make this determination, the term ‘immovable property’  as it is used for 
common –law purposes and the potential misalignment of this definition when 
compared to the term as it is used in the ITA must be analysed.  
3.3 Structure and research questions 
Each chapter in this dissertation answers questions relevant to the central 
question of whether a mineral right constitutes ‘immovable property’ for 
purposes of South African and international tax. 
Chapter 4 outlines the South African tax system, specifically the components 
that would apply to a transaction involving a non-resident company selling its 
shares in a South African property-rich company.   
Chapter 5 analyses the structure of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the 
ITA and identifies potential issues with the meaning of the words ‘immovable 
property’ as it is currently contained in the ITA. 
The common-law principles relating to immovable property and mineral rights 
is examined in Chapter 6 with the objective of distinguishing the common-law 
meaning of ‘immovable property’ from the meaning in the ITA.  
The legal nature of a mineral right is further discussed in Chapter 7 with a view 
to determining how a mineral right is classified in other legislation and the ITA. 
Chapter 8 provides an analysis of the immovable property article in the South 
African DTA network as well as the capital gains article.  
The conclusion of the analyses with recommendations is set out in chapter 9.  
 
 




3.4 Limitations to the study 
This study does not examine the domestic law of other countries nor any other 
taxes (for example, Value Added Tax, Customs and Excise, etc).  
In addition, this study is not concerned with the taxation of international (non-
resident) individuals or trusts disposing of shares in mining or oil and gas 
companies. The focus of this research paper is on the taxation of a sale of shares 
in a mining or oil and gas company in South Africa by a non-resident company. 
The position of South African resident companies is likewise not considered.   
 
 




4 The South African income tax system  
4.1 Introduction 
Since the key question posed in this paper delves into the South African income 
tax system, this chapter broadly outlines the South African income tax system. 
Since the scope of this paper is limited to non-resident companies selling shares 
in South African mining or oil and gas companies, the discussion on the South 
African tax system is limited to what would be relevant for this type of 
transaction.  
4.2 South Africa’s income tax system 
South Africa has adopted a dual source or residence basis of taxation, in terms 
of which residents are taxed on their worldwide income. Non-residents are taxed 
on South African sourced income only.
8
 Both resident and non-resident 
companies are taxed at a corporate rate of 28 per cent. 
4.2.1 Residency  
Section 1 of the ITA defines a ‘resident’ as a person other than a natural person 
(eg a company) that is incorporated, established or formed in the Republic or 
which has its place of effective management in the Republic.9 Specifically 
excluded from the definition of ‘resident’ is any company that ‘is deemed to be 
exclusively a resident of another country for purposes of the application of any 
agreement entered into between the governments of the Republic and that other 
country for the avoidance of double taxation’.10  
                                                     
8 Definition of ‘gross income’ in section 1 of the ITA 
9 Paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘resident’ in section 1 of the ITA 
10 Paragraph (A) of the definition of ‘resident’ in section 1 of the ITA 
 
 




Accordingly, a non-resident company would be a company that is deemed, by 
virtue of the application of a DTA, to be exclusively resident in a foreign 
country.  
In the event, a company is found to be resident in both South Africa and a 
foreign country, DTAs contain a deeming provision that renders a company to 
be a resident of whichever State its place of effective management is situated.  
For purposes of the discussion to follow on the application of CGT, it is 
important to keep in mind the distinction between a resident and non-resident 
for tax purposes as the CGT treatment differs.    
4.2.2 Source 
The term ‘source’ is not defined specifically in the ITA but there are limited 
definitions contained in section 9 of the ITA which contains specific source 
rules for certain receipts and accruals that are regarded as having their source in 
South Africa, even if the actual source is not in South Africa.    
With regard to immovable property, section 9(2)(j) of the ITA regards an 
amount to be from a source within South Africa if such an amount has been 
received by or accrued in respect of the disposal of an asset that constitutes 
immovable property or any interest in or right to an asset which constitutes 
immovable property, as contemplated in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule, 
and that property is situated in South Africa.
11
 
Thus, section 9(2)(j) of the ITA specifically states that the source of income 
attributable to immovable property, or any interest or right therein, is where the 
immovable property is located. 
                                                     
11 Section 9(2)(j) of the ITA 
 
 




The specific source rules contained in section 9(2)(j) of the ITA is in line with 
the position adopted by South African courts, ie that the source of immovable 
property is where it is situated.
12 
 
To the extent, therefore, that the disposal of shares in a mining company located 
in South Africa constitutes immovable property or any interest or right therein, 
any amount received in respect of the disposal of such shares will be regarded as 
being from a source in South Africa. Accordingly, such income would be 
subject to South African income tax in the hands of the non-resident company at 
a rate of 28 per cent. If the shares are held as capital assets by the non-resident 
company, the proceeds of the sale of shares would be subject to CGT. 
4.2.3 Capital versus revenue 
Before discussing the application of CGT, it would first be important to point 
out the difference between the revenue treatment of a disposal of shares and the 
capital treatment of a disposal of shares as it relates to the later analyses. 
The income tax treatment of a transaction that is capital in nature differs 
significantly to a transaction that is revenue in nature. With regard to the sale of 
shares, there is a plethora of case law dealing with the issue of whether a sale of 
shares is capital or revenue in nature. Prior to the introduction of CGT in the 
ITA, transactions of a capital nature were excluded from gross income. Capital 
gains now form part of taxable income; however, it is still advantageous for a 
transaction to be classified as capital in nature than revenue given that CGT rate 
for companies is 66.6 per cent. 
4.2.4 CGT 
Paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA defines the scope of the CGT 
legislation and prescribes who is subject to CGT as well as which assets of such 
persons are subject to CGT.
13
  
                                                     
12 Rhodesia Metals Ltd (in Liquidation) v Commissioner of Taxes (1938) AD 
 
 




An ‘asset’ is defined in paragraph 1 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA and 
includes “property of whatever nature, whether movable or immovable, 
corporeal or incorporeal, excluding any currency, but including any coin made 
mainly from gold or platinum and a right or interest of whatever nature to or in 
such property”. 
A ‘disposal’ is defined in paragraph 11 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA as 
“any event, act, forbearance or operation of law which results in the creation, 
variation, transfer or extinction of an asset” and includes “the sale, donation, 
expropriation, conversion, grant, cession, exchange or any other alienation or 
transfer of ownership of an asset.” Specific events have been excluded from the 
definition of a disposal event such as the issue or cancellation of shares in a 
company.  
In the case of a resident,
14
 paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA 
provides that the disposal of any asset would be subject to CGT. 
Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA provides that the Eighth 
Schedule will apply to the disposal of the following assets held by a non-
resident: 
(i) immovable property situated in the Republic held by that person or any 
interest or right of whatever nature of that person to or in immovable 
property situated in the Republic; or 
(ii) any asset which is attributable to a permanent establishment of that person in 
the Republic.  
Whereas the resident is subject to CGT on any asset whether disposed of inside 
or outside of South Africa, a non-resident may be subject to CGT in South 
Africa not only in respect of the sale of land or property attached to land which 
is situated in South Africa (ie immovable property), but also in respect of the 
                                                                                                                                              
13 Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax (Issue 4), released by SARS in December 2011, page 45 at 
para 4.2 
14 Defined in section 1 of the ITA 
 
 




disposal of interests or real rights relating to immovable property such as 
registered leases, usufructs, mineral rights, etc.      
The non-resident will not be taxed on the disposal of any other asset unless it is 
attributable to a permanent establishment (PE). Thus, should the non-resident 
seller not have a permanent establishment in South Africa, it is trite that 
paragraph 2(1)(b)(ii) above would not apply.  
‘Immovable property’ is not a defined term in the ITA, however, the meaning of 
‘interest in immovable property’ is provided in paragraph 2(2) of the ITA.  
Paragraph 2(2) states as follows: 
“For purposes of subparagraph (1)(b)(i), an interest in immovable 
property situated in the Republic includes any equity shares held by a 
person in a company or ownership or the right to ownership of a person in 
any other entity or a vested interest of a person in any assets of any trust, 
if –  
(a) 80 per cent or more of the market value of those equity shares, 
ownership or right to ownership or vested interest, as the case may 
be, at the time of disposal thereof is attributable to directly or 
indirectly to immovable property held otherwise than as trading 
stock; and 
(b) In the case of a company or other entity, that person (whether alone 
or together with any connected person in relation to that person), 
directly or indirectly, holds at least 20 per cent of the equity shares 
in that company or ownership or right to ownership of that other 
entity.” 
It is important to remember that CGT is not a separate tax from income tax. 
Instead, a taxpayer is required to include its ‘net capital gain’
15
 for the year of 
assessment in its taxable income, at the relevant inclusion rate. In the case of a 
                                                     
15 Defined in paragraph 8 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA 
 
 




company, the inclusion rate is 66.6 per cent. Hence, the seller will be subject to 
CGT in South Africa at an effective rate of 18.6 per cent on the net capital gains 
realised on the disposal of any asset (in the case of a resident) or immovable 
property or any interest or right therein (in the case of a non-resident)  during 
any year of assessment. 
Should a net capital loss be realised in any year of assessment, such loss may 
not be set-off against other taxable income and is carried forward to be set-off 
against future capital gains. 
A person’s ‘capital gain’
16
 or ‘capital loss’
17
 for a year of assessment, in respect 
of the disposal of an asset is defined, in essence, as the difference between the 
‘proceeds’
18
 received or accrued in respect of the disposal or deemed disposal of 
an asset and the ‘base cost’
19
 of that asset.  
The “proceeds” from the disposal of an asset include, inter alia, the amount
20
 
received by or accrued to, or which is treated as having been received by, or 




The amount received by or accrued as proceeds will be reduced by, inter alia; 
any amount that must be included in the gross income of that person or that must 
be taken into account when determining the taxable income of that person 
before the inclusion of any taxable capital gain.
22
 For example, any depreciation 
allowances recovered or recouped on disposal of an asset would have been 
included in the gross income of a person and should, consequently, reduce the 
proceeds received on disposal of that asset. 
                                                     
16 Paragraph 3 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA 
17 Paragraph 4 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA 
18 Defined in paragraph 35 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA  
19 Defined in paragraph 20 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA 
20 South African courts have held that the word ‘amount’ must be given a wide meaning and would include 
‘not only money, but the value of every form of property earned by the taxpayer, whether corporeal or 
incorporeal, which has a money value’. 
21 Paragraph 35(1) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA 
22 Paragraph 35(3) of the Eight Schedule to the ITA 
 
 




In the case of the disposal of immovable property or any interest or right therein 
by a non-resident, the proceeds will be an amount equal to the amount or 
amounts received by or accruing to the non-resident in exchange for the transfer 
or sale of such immovable property or interest or right therein.  
Furthermore, where the parties to the transaction are ‘connected persons’,
23
 the 
person disposing of the asset must be treated, for CGT purposes, as having 
disposed of that asset at market value,
24
 and the person acquiring the asset is 
treated as having acquired the asset also for an amount equal to the same market 
value. 
4.2.5 Withholding tax on immovable property 
In the case of non-resident sellers of South African immovable property, a 
withholding tax on the gross amount paid to them is imposed in terms of section 
35A of the ITA. The withholding tax is equal to: 
 5 per cent, where the non-resident is natural person; 
 7.5 per cent, where the non-resident is a company; and 
 10 per cent, where the non-resident is a trust. 
Since the scope of my analyses is limited to transactions involving non-resident 
companies, only the 7.5 per cent withholding tax rate is relevant hereon after. 
Although, at the time, non-residents were subject to income tax (including CGT) 
on a source basis, the revenue authorities were not able to properly administer 
taxation on the sourced income of non-residents attributed to the disposal of 
immovable property in South Africa. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the 2004 RLAA explains the introduction of 
the withholding tax as follows:  
                                                     
23 Defined in section 1 of the ITA  
24 Paragraph 38(1)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA 
 
 




“The current system of taxing locally sourced capital gains generated by 
non-residents is consistent with international best practice and is well-
recognised by international income tax treaties. However, this system of 
source taxation lacks one essential element – proper administrative 
enforcement through withholding. Many countries that tax capital gains 
generated by non-residents impose a special withholding regime when the 
sale involves immovable property. This withholding regime is often 
critical because the non-resident’s connection to the source country is 
often tenuous, making enforcement impossible once the immovable 
property is sold. Enforcement is much easier in terms of the purchaser 
because the purchaser is the party holding the local immovable property 
upon completion of the transaction. As a side matter, this form of 
withholding is not internationally utilised in the case of capital gains 
generated by non-residents when those gains are associated with a local 
permanent establishment. No withholding is required in these instances 
because the non-resident’s practical connection to the source country is 
much more extensive.” 
From this extract, it is clear that the reason for introducing the withholding tax 
was pure administrative convenience, ie the purchaser now had the obligation to 
collect an amount for which the non-resident would themselves be liable for in 
terms of normal tax. It must be noted that the obligation on the purchaser to 
withhold the tax is irrespective of whether the purchaser is resident in South 
Africa or not and also irrespective of whether the amount of the purchase price 
is capital or revenue in nature.   
Section 35A therefore provides that where a non-resident company disposes of 
an asset to a person that is either a South African resident or a non-South 
 
 




African resident, the person purchasing the asset is obligated to withhold an 
amount of 7.5 per cent from the purchase price.25  
Importantly, however, for section 35A to be applicable, the non-resident must 
have disposed of “immovable property” in South Africa. In terms of section 
35A(15) of the ITA, immovable property is defined to mean ‘immovable 
property’ as contemplated in paragraphs 2(1)(b)(i) and (2) of the Eighth 
Schedule in the ITA. 
With regard to the administration of the withholding tax, the tax withheld must 
be paid by the purchaser to the South African Revenue Service (SARS) within 
fourteen days after the date of withholding (where the purchaser is a resident) 
and twenty eight days (where the purchaser is non-resident).26 A return has to be 
submitted by the purchaser making the payment.27 Penalties will be payable by 
the purchaser should the relevant amount not be paid to SARS within the time 
prescribed. 
The seller may, however, apply to SARS for a directive to the effect that no 
amount or a reduced amount must be withheld. SARS, in turn, ‘solely having 
regard’ to the following factors, may determine whether to grant the directive 
sought by the seller: 
 Any security furnished for the payment of tax due on disposal of the 
immovable property; 
 The extent of the seller’s assets in South Africa;  
 Whether the seller is subject to tax in respect of the disposal of the 
immovable property; and 
 Whether the seller’s actual tax liability in respect of the disposal of the 
immovable property is less than the amount required to be withheld.
28
  
Unlike a withholding tax on royalties or similar payments to non-residents under 
section 35 of the ITA, this is not a final withholding tax in that the amounts 
                                                     
25 Section 35A(1)(b) of the ITA 
26 Section 35A(4) of the ITA 
27 Section 35A(6) of the ITA 
28 Section 35A(2) of the ITA 
 
 




withheld act as a credit against the final normal tax liability for the year of 
assessment in which the property is disposed of.
29
  




 if the amounts payable by the purchaser in aggregate do not exceed R2 
million, thereby limiting the withholding obligation to high-value properties. 
If the purchase consideration exceeds R2 million, the withholding 
requirements apply to the total consideration without regard to the R2 
million exemption; and 
 to a deposit payable by the purchaser for the purpose of securing the disposal 
of immovable property until the agreement has been entered into. Once 
entered into, any withholding tax required to have been withheld from the 
deposit must be withheld from the first payment made by the purchaser other 




                                                     
29 Section 35A(3) of the ITA 
30 Section 35A(14) of the ITA 
 
 




5 Analysis of ‘immovable property’ as used in the ITA 
As highlighted in 4.2.4, whereas CGT may be levied on the disposal of any asset 
of a resident, its application with respect to non-residents is limited to the 
disposal of immovable property or any interest or right therein. 
5.1.1 Lack of definition in the ITA 
‘Immovable property’ on its own is not defined generally in the ITA or 
specifically in the Eighth Schedule. Instead,  paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth 
Schedule to the ITA  states that, for purposes of paragraph 2(1)(b)(i), ‘an interest 
in immovable property’ includes any equity shares held by a non-resident person 
if 80 per cent or more of the market value of those equity shares, as at the time 
of the disposal thereof by the non-resident, ‘is attributable directly or indirectly 
to immovable property’ situated in South Africa and which is held as a capital 
asset (i.e. otherwise than as trading stock); and such  non-resident person 
directly or indirectly holds at least 20 per cent of those equity shares.  
Strangely enough, the words ‘immovable property’ occurs at least four times in 
paragraph 2 of the Eight Schedule, yet the legislators did not feel the need to 
include a definition either specifically for the Eighth Schedule or more broadly 
in the ITA.  
As has been explained in the previous chapter, the withholding tax in terms of 
section 35A of the ITA only applies where a non-resident sells ‘immovable 
property’ situated in South Africa. Section 35A(14) defines ‘immovable 
property’ to mean “immovable property contemplated in paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) 
and (2) of the Eighth Schedule.”  
Importantly, it is not ‘immovable property’ that is defined in paragraph 
2(1)(b)(i) and (2) of the Eighth Schedule but ‘an interest in immovable 
property’ that is defined in paragraph 2(2) for purposes of interpreting those 
words in paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) of the Eighth Schedule. 
 
 






 if a word is not defined or is incompletely defined in the 
ITA one needs to look at the Interpretation Act for a definition. If the word is 
not defined in the Interpretation Act, the word or phrase must be interpreted 
according to the ordinary meaning in the dictionary. Haupt goes on to say: 
 “Full effect must be given to all the words used in a provision, No word 
must be assumed to be superfluous. Where a provision does not make 
sense the courts have had to (of necessity) imply words or meanings... 
Mbha J, in Tax Case No. 12860 ... said: “It is accepted generally that the 
meaning of the words in a statute is derived from the common-law. The 
basic rule of interpretation is that the meaning must, unless it would result 
in an absurdity, be taken to be the ordinary meaning of the word which 
can now be found in a dictionary of established authority.”” 
Following Haupt’s recommendation where a word is not defined in the ITA, a 
review of the Interpretation Act,
32
 indicates no definition for ‘immovable 
property’ either. The ordinary dictionary meaning of ‘immovable’ indicates it 
means “not able to be moved” or “consisting of land, buildings, or other 
permanent items”.
33
The dictionary meaning of ‘property’ is “a thing or things 
belonging to someone” or “a building or buildings and the land belonging to it 
or them”.
34
Thus, the ordinary meaning of the words ‘immovable’ and ‘property’ 
as defined in the dictionary leans towards referring to property in a corporeal 
sense and does not envisage rights or interests in property (i.e. incorporeal 
property) to be immovable property per se.  
                                                     
31 Phillip Haupt, Notes on South African Income Tax, 2013, page 12 
32 No. 33 of 1957 
33 Sourced from Oxford Dictionary. Online at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/immovable on 16 February 2014 
34 Sourced from Oxford Dictionary. Online at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/immovable on 16 February 2014 
 
 




5.1.2 Structure of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule 
Having established that there is no definition, specific or otherwise, of 
‘immovable property’ in the ITA and that the ordinary meaning of the words 
refers to property in a corporeal sense, it is important to analyse paragraph 2 of 
the Eighth Schedule in more detail.  
In paragraph 2(1)(b)(i), the words ‘immovable property’ are used twice in two 
phrases couched as alternatives – once in the phrase “immovable property 
situated in the Republic” and then again, after being linked by the conjunction 
“or”, used in the second phrase “any right or interest of whatever nature ... to 
or in immovable property”. 
Analysing paragraph 2(1)(b)(i), it may be concluded using the normal tenets of 
interpretation of statutes that the words ‘immovable property’ as used in the first 
instance refers to property in the normal meaning of the word (i.e. corporeal 
property) and not to any interest or right in that property (i.e. not to incorporeal 
property) for purposes of section 35A of the ITA.  
This conclusion may be drawn since where the second phrase in the sub-
paragraph quoted above refers to “any interest or right ... to or in immovable 
property...” it clearly refers to incorporeal property (i.e. a right to property is 
incorporeal). Thus, where the words ‘immovable property’ is used in the first 
phrase of the sub-paragraph quoted above, it cannot also be ascribed to the same 
meaning as “any interest or right ... to or in immovable property”. If this was 
the case, the subsequent reference to “any interest or right ... to or in immovable 
property” would be repetition or superfluous. In addition, to refer to the same 
concept twice in one sentence yet in the alternative (linked by the word “or”) 
makes no grammatical sense (for instance, “an apple or an apple” is an absurd 
sentence construction).  
If the argument is to be followed that the words ‘immovable property’ in 
paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act refer only to corporeal 
 
 




property (as opposed to also including incorporeal rights in respect of 
immovable property), then where the same words are used twice in paragraph 
2(1)(b)(i), it should have the same meaning, namely corporeal immovable 
property (i.e. to refer to land and fixtures to land).  
It could then be argued that the 80 per cent rule, in terms of paragraph 2(2)(a) of 
the Eighth Schedule, should only apply with regards to immovable property (i.e. 
corporeal), and not ‘a right or interest ... in immovable property’ (i.e. 
incorporeal) since 80 per cent of the market value of the shares being disposed 
of must be attributable to immovable property (i.e. corporeal). Accordingly, the 
value of mineral rights would not be included in calculating the 80 per cent 
value of the share, as these rights are incorporeal in nature and would not be 
regarded as ‘immovable property’ as provided in paragraph 2(2)(a) of the Eighth 
Schedule. 
The Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax (Issue 4) published by SARS 
(the CGT guide), defines immovable property according to LAWSA as “things 
which cannot be moved from one place to another without damage or change of 
form”.
35
 Examples of immovable property cited in the CGT guide include real 
rights over immovable property.
36
  
Paragraph 4.1.2.3 of the CGT guide argues that “new order rights” (which 
would include mining, prospecting, exploration or production rights issued in 
terms of the MPRDA) share characteristics of other types of immovable 
property including that (i) they are limited real rights, (ii) they are granted in 
respect of the mineral and the related land implying a close causal connection 
with the mineral and the land, (iii) the subject matter of the right can only be 
removed by causing damage to the land because the land has to be excavated to 
extract the mineral and (iv) those rights are not dissimilar to a long-term lease, a 
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usufruct or a servitude, all of which are rights of enjoyment of immovable 
property.  
Interestingly, paragraphs 4.1.2.1 and 4.2.2.2 of the CGT guide deals with 
corporeal and incorporeal property respectively. The distinction between 
corporeal and incorporeal property as discussed in the CGT guide can be 
summarized as follows – corporeal property such as land and buildings have the 
capacity to be handled or touched whereas incorporeal things are imaginary 
concepts that cannot be seen or touched such as personal or real rights.
37
   
It is worthwhile noting that paragraph 4.1.2.3 of the CGT guide is a sub-
paragraph of paragraph 4.1.2 of the CGT guide which deals with the definition 
of the word ‘asset’ as defined in the Eighth Schedule. 
Importantly, the words ‘immovable property’ is not used in the definition of the 
term ‘asset’, as defined in the Eighth Schedule. The words used in paragraph (a) 
of the definition of “asset” in paragraph 1 of the Eighth Schedule are 
“…property of whatever nature, whether movable or immovable, corporeal or 
incorporeal…” Both corporeal and incorporeal are specifically included into the 
definition. Thus, where reference is made to property which is immovable, it is 
not necessary to include incorporeal property in that concept (since incorporeal 
property is specifically included in the definition of ‘asset’ in addition to the 
reference to property that is immovable). In other words the concepts of 
immovable and incorporeal are divisible for purposes of the Eighth Schedule.  
5.1.3 Effect on CGT if mineral right is not immovable property 
To be able to determine whether the provisions of paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth 
Schedule apply to a non-resident disposing of a share in a company that holds a 
mineral right, it is necessary to consider the meaning of paragraph 2(2). It is 
clear that the phrase ‘interest in immovable property’ in paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) is 
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given a specific meaning in the introductory passage to paragraph 2(2) of the 
Eighth Schedule.  
In the introductory passage, it is provided that, for purposes of sub-paragraph 
2(1)(b)(i) ‘an interest in immovable property’ includes “any equity shares held 
by a person in a company … if 80 per cent or more of the market value of those 
equity shares … at the time of disposal thereof is attributable directly or 
indirectly to immovable property held otherwise than as trading stock.” 
In this regard, the 80 per cent of the market value of the equity shares need to be 
attributable to ‘immovable property’ only and not to ‘any interest or right of 
whatever nature to or in immovable property’. Thus, it is possible, in the 
absence of a definition of ‘immovable property’ in the ITA, that a disposal of 
shares in a mineral company would not meet the 80 per cent rule of paragraph 
2(2)(a), as a consequence of which no CGT would apply to such a transaction. 
For purposes of completeness, it should be clear that the words ‘directly or 
indirectly’ in paragraph 2(2)(a) indicate the intention of  the legislature to 
include, not only the value of immovable property perhaps owned by the non-
resident, but also immovable property owned by any other company in which 




5.1.4 Effect on section 35A if mineral right is not immovable property 
To iterate, section 35A(15) of the ITA states that ‘immovable property’ for 
purposes of section 35A “means immovable property as contemplated in 
paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) and 2 of the Eighth Schedule.” (emphasis added). In 
terms of the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Rogut v Rogut,
39
 the word 
“means” “indicates that what follows is in their nature of a precise definition. 
Obviously it is not as expansive as “includes”.” Thus, if the provisions of 
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paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) and 2 of the Eighth Schedule do not apply to the transaction 
envisaged, the provisions of section 35A should also not apply. 
Section 35A(3) provides that the 7.5 per cent withholding tax “is an advance” in 
respect of the seller’s “liability for normal tax.” The fact that the 7.5 per cent 
withholding tax “is an advance” in respect of the seller’s “liability for normal 
tax” means that the seller must in fact have a “liability for normal tax”. It could 
be said that such “liability for normal tax” does not arise because paragraph 2 of 
the Eighth Schedule does not apply to the disposal of shares where the shares 
are not attributable to immovable property.   
 
 




6 Mineral rights in South Africa 
6.1 Introduction 
Given the gravitas of the preliminary conclusions set out above in Error! 
eference source not found. and 5.1.4, it would be important to consider the 
meaning of the words ‘immovable property’ in terms of common-law principles. 
Should there be a dispute in this regard between a taxpayer and SARS over 
seemingly insufficient clarity in the ITA, the interpretation of not only statutory 
legislation is important but also the common-law principles set out by earlier 
court cases.   
This chapter looks at the common-law principles related to immovable property 
and how the history of mineral rights in South Africa shaped those principles. 
The objective of this chapter is to review the common-law meaning of 
‘immovable property’ and distinguish this from the meaning of those words 
ascribed by the previous chapter. 
6.2 Historical background of mineral rights in South Africa 
Africa is exceptionally rich in minerals and South Africa, in particular, has 
extensive deposits of important mineral ore.
40
 Over the years, regional 
legislation was adopted to regulate the exploration and mining of particular 
categories of minerals. In 1991, the Minerals Act No.50 of 1991, as amended 
(the 1991 Minerals Act) was enacted to consolidate the various regional laws 
into a single mineral regime for South Africa.
41
  
                                                     
40 Extracted from http://www.physchem.co.za/OB11-sys/mining.htm#sa on 25 May 2013 








6.2.1 Common-law principles relating to immovable property 
South African present day common-law is drawn primarily from Roman-Dutch 
and, to a lesser extent, English law, which have been combined and adapted by 
the courts so as to meet what the courts perceived as the country’s own evolving 
needs
42
. In general, the South African law of property has developed out of these 
three main components of Roman, Dutch and English law. 
The most important classification of property is the division between movables 
and immovables. 
43
 Stated generally, immovable property is land and those 
things that are attached to land either naturally or by artificial means in such a 
manner that it cannot be detached from the land without being damaged and 
without losing its identity.
44
  
It becomes more complex to define immovable property generally when one 
considers whether incorporeal things constitute immovable property. If it does, 
it must further be determined which of those incorporeal things qualify as 
immovable property. South African early case law evidences that this question 
was as relevant as it is now.  
In Ex Parte Master of the Supreme Court
45
, the question was whether a deed of 
lease for 99 years constituted ‘immovable property’ as that term was used in the 
Administration of Estates Proclamation of 1902. Section 108 of the 
proclamation allowed the Master to invest monies to the Guardian’s Fund on 
mortgage of immovable property. The Court, noting that the term was not 
defined, held that it must be assumed that the legislature used the expression 
‘immovable property’ in its ordinary legal sense. After examining the common-
law writers such as Van Der Keesel, Voet and Mattheus, the Court concluded 
that the Roman law recognised the division of incorporeal rights between 
movable or immovable wherever possible. The Court considered that such a 
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division of incorporeal property does not only seem to be the general rule in the 
Roman Dutch law, but had also been adopted by the legislature in the Transvaal 
where it clearly dealt with incorporeal property as immovable property in 
several statutes. As a consequence, the Court ruled that a lease over fixed 
property for a period of 99 years constituted immovable property for purposes of 
the Administration of Estates Proclamation. This view has since been confirmed 
by other authors on the law of property
46
. 
A distinction should be drawn between real and personal rights where real rights 
have corporeal property as its object whilst performance by another person is the 
object of a personal right. Following this distinction, it could be said that a 
personal right will never qualify as immovable property whilst real rights can be 
divided into real rights pertaining to immovable property which are then 
regarded as immovable and real rights pertaining to movable things which are 
than regarded as movable incorporeal property.  
This logical approach, however, is not consistently applied since, as has been 
shown in the Ex Parte Master case, long term leases are recognised as 
immovable property whilst short term leases (which are real rights, albeit 
limited, in respect of immovable properties) are generally not recognised as 
immovable property. This distinction was probably brought about by the 
definition of immovable property in section 102 of the Deeds Registries Act.
47
 
The Deeds Registries Act defines ‘immovable property’ to include, inter alia –  
“Any registered lease of land which, when entered into, was for a period of 
not less than ten years or for the natural life of the lessee or any other 
person mentioned in the lease, or which is renewable from time to time at the 
will of the lessee indefinitely or for the periods which together with the first 
period amount in all to not less than ten years (emphasis added)” 
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Thus, earlier case law suggests that where the words ‘immovable property’ are 
not defined, the Courts will look to other legislation where the term is defined 
(more than one statute if need be) to determine the legislator’s intention.  
6.2.2 Common-law principles relating to mineral rights 
Roman law regarded minerals as fruits of the soil and did not allow separate 
mineral rights with regard to the soil.
48
 English law on the other hand recognised 
separate ownership of strata of the soil under the surface as possible.
49
  
Given the massive capital investment mining houses had to outlay (and still do 
today) for mining projects, it was necessary to provide such mining companies 
with distinct real rights as security.
50
 Thus, an entire structure of mineral and 
mining law had to be evolved in South Africa by the courts and various 
legislatures. The need for such development arose from a lack of such laws in 
the Roman-Dutch system (which can be linked to the lack of mining activities in 






 The South African practice, 
which did not recognise the English notion that horizontal layers of land beneath 
the soil could belong to the different owners, in the view of the exclusive nature 
of ownership therefore sought to structure mineral rights as distinct limited real 
rights that could exist alongside ownership on the same land.
52
   
In Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 
1996 (4) SA 499 (A), two companies had mineral rights and mining title in 
respect of precious metals whilst another two companies held all the other 
mineral rights and the right to prospect for all other minerals. The Court was 
faced with deciding on the conflict between the two rights holders. 
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49 Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) case of Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA (CALS amicus 
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With regard to the nature of the rights to minerals which had been separated 
from the ownership of the land, the Court held that such rights were real rights. 
In the case of irreconcilable conflict between the exercise of these rights and the 
interests of the landowner, the latter were subordinated. The minerals continued 
to be the property of the landowner for as long as they remained in the ground; it 
was only when the holder of the right to the minerals severed them that they 
became movables owned by him. Those are the main established common-law 




The concept of mineral rights is founded on the right to mine.
54
 In the Agri SA 
SCA case, Wallis J questioned whether the right to mine actually had its source 
in the common-law as the plaintiff, Agri SA, sought to claim in that case.  
Wallis J highlighted in the Agri SA SCA case that the common-law principle is 
that the rights of the owner of immovable property extend up to the heavens and 
down to the centre of the earth.
55
 This is usually expressed in the maxim cuius 
est solum eius usque ad caelum et ad inferos (usually abbreviated in academic 
writing as the cuius est solum principle). Thus, in general, the owners of 
property are free to do with the land what they wish to do. This, Wallis J, argues 
is the foundation of the view that as a matter of common-law, the right to mine 
vests in the owner of the land.
56
     
Whilst it has been a long-standing principle to regard mineral rights as 
‘common-law’ rights
57
, and this characterisation was certainly adopted by the 
trial court leading up to the Agri SA SCA case, Wallis J sought to establish that 
what has come to be referred to as common-law mineral rights, in both the 
judgement of the trial court and academic writings, in fact originate largely from 
statutory law governing the right to mine and legislation that permitted personal 
                                                     
53 At 509A – 510A 
54 Agri SA SCA case (supra) at para 28 
55 Agri SA SCA case (supra) at para 32 
56 Agri SA SCA case (supra)at para 33 
57 Trojan Exploration Co (supra) 
 
 




rights, obtained under contracts, to be registered as rights separate from the 
ownership of the land to which those rights related.
58
 Whilst the legal issue of 
expropriation formed the basis of the judgements in the trial court, SCA and 
Constitutional Court (Concourt) and expropriation itself bears no relevance to 
the outcome of this paper, the historical analyses of mineral rights in South 
Africa provided in the trial court but more especially the SCA case bears some 
consideration and it is thus worthwhile to consider the judgements of both Du 
Plessis J in the trial court as well as Wallis J in the SCA case. Chief Justice 
Mogoeng Mogoeng’s Concourt judgement will also be considered to the extent 
it can be distinguished from the findings of the SCA case.   
6.2.3 Facts of the Agri SA cases 
The facts of the case were a company, namely Sebenza Mining (Pty) Ltd 
(Sebenza) held coal rights on certain farms situated in Mpumalanga. It did not 
have any prospecting permit or mining authorisation under the 1991 Minerals 
Act. In April 2004, the members resolved to wind it up. In May 2004, the 
MPRDA commenced. The rights were sold to a third party for R750 000. 
Lawyers for both seller and purchaser gave opinions that the MPRDA had 
caused the rights to cease to exist rendering the sale void. In 2006, Sebenza’s 
liquidators applied to the DMR for compensation claiming the State had 
expropriated the rights in terms of item 12(1) of Schedule II to the MPRDA. The 
claim was rejected by the DMR. On 10 October 2006, Sebenza ceded its claim 
to Agri SA, which acquired it for R250 000, for the purpose of initiating legal 
proceedings, having identified the case as being a suitable test case.   
6.2.4 Issues  
The issues before the trial court were whether the MPRDA deprived Sebenza of 
its coal rights. If so, it needed to be determined if Sebenza had been 
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expropriated of its coal rights and, if so, whether Sebenza (and thus Agri SA as 
cessionary) was entitled to compensation? 
6.2.5 Trial court judgement 
On the first issue of deprivation, the trial court held that the commencement of 
the MPRDA had deprived Sebenza of its rights on the basis that the common-
law right included the entitlement to go onto the property, to search for the 
mineral and sever it and carry it away. The MPRDA, the trial court held, did not 
recognise this common-law right and had as such, deprived Sebenza of its coal 
rights. On the second issue of expropriation, the court held that Item 8 of 
Schedule 3 of the MPRDA gave the holder of an unused old-order right only the 
right to apply for a prospecting or mining right defined in section 5 of the 
MPRDA. In effect, this constituted an expropriation. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff, Agri SA, had a right to compensation to R750 000.  
6.2.6 Different conclusion reached by the SCA  
In a unanimous judgement delivered in May 2012, the SCA upheld an appeal by 
the Minister of Minerals and Energy (the Minister). The Court had to decide on 
Agri SA’s contention that a blanket expropriation of mineral rights had been 
triggered when the MPRDA commenced. It is important to analyse the reasons 
for the different conclusions reached by the SCA in relation to the trial court. 
The principle that mineral rights are regarded as common-law rights was 
rejected by Wallis J in the Agri SA SCA case. He determined that such a 
characterisation was incorrect and that it was merely ‘a convenient shorthand 
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Wallis J, in delving into the history of mineral rights (the detail of which one is 
encouraged to read from paragraphs 29 to 80 of the judgement as it provides a 
detailed historical analysis) endeavours to show that the State always asserted 
that the right to mine is vested in the State and that the State either exercises or 
allocates that right. The MPRDA is to be seen as another piece of legislation in 
many, over the years, that affirms that the right to mine is vested in the State. 
Thus, for purposes of the Agri SA SCA case, the Court found that the 
fundamental right to mine had not been expropriated from the holders of mineral 
rights by the commencement of the MPRDA. This conclusion was supported by 
the fact that the MPRDA afforded security of tenure through transitional 
provisions contained in the MPRDA. However, the Court did emphasis that 
there exists the possibility of an argument that a right had been expropriated by 
the MPRDA in specific factual circumstances but held that the contention 
advanced by Agri SA that there had been a general expropriation of mineral 
rights was unfounded. This was so whether one considered mineral rights 
generally or only unused mineral rights.    
The nature of prospecting or mining rights was explored further in the Agri SA 
SCA case, wherein Wallis J noted that ‘mineral rights’ under earlier legislation 
“were held either by the owner of land or, where they had been separated from 
the land in respect of which the rights were exercised, the holder of a separate 
right,” and that those rights can for present purposes be referred to generally as 
mineral right and the beneficiaries of the rights as holders of mineral rights.
60
 
Some judgments refer more succinctly to the “right to mine”, which has 
similarly come to denote “the right to prospect and mine for minerals and extract 
and dispose of them.”
61
  
                                                     










 go on to describe the concept of ‘mineral rights’ as 
follows with reference to the Agri SA SCA case: 
“It is a real right, sometimes referred to as quasi-servitude
63 
and must therefore 
be distinguished from the ius in re sua (ownership) of the minerals as such. The 
granting of a right to explore and mine minerals could be obtained in various 
ways. The owner of the land could apply for a certificate of rights to minerals in 
respect of the land of which he or she was the owner. Mineral rights could be 
ceded to a third person through the registration of a notarial deed registered 
against the title deed of the land, or a certificate could be issued to the third 
person authorising that third person to explore and to mine the minerals. The 
right granted to the third person could apply in general or only in respect of a 
particular category of minerals. It was not uncommon in South Africa for 
landowners to separate their ownership of the land from mineral rights, for 




Where mineral rights vested in a person other than the landowner, that person 
was “entitled to go upon the property to which they relate to search for minerals, 
and, if he (the holder) finds any, to sever them and carry them away.”
65
 Upon 
separation of the minerals from the land, they became distinct legal objects, and 
the person with mineral rights would acquire ownership of the minerals 
separated from the land.  
The person who has acquired mineral rights was also entitled to transfer the 
right to search for and to mine the minerals to a third person. This could be done 
through (a) a prospecting contract, or (b) a mineral lease agreement. The mineral 
lease agreement afforded the right for a limited period only. The repository of 
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mineral rights could claim compensation from the third person to whom he or 
she had transferred the prospecting rights. 
One must therefore distinguish between (a) the ownership of minerals and (b) 
mineral rights in the sense of searching for and extracting minerals from the 
land. Ownership of minerals that formed part of the land vested in the 
landowner, and following their extraction from the land vested in the person 
with mineral rights, which could be the owner of the land or a person other than 
the land owner.” 
6.2.7 Concourt decision 
The Concourt found against Agri SA but for different reasons from the SCA that 
expropriation had not come about with the enactment of the MPRDA. With 
regard to the nature of the affected rights, the Concourt majority disagreed with 
the SCA that mineral rights did not constitute property,
66
 observing that under 
the previous regime, only the owner of mineral rights could apply for a licence, 
while it could choose whether to exploit its underlying rights.   
6.2.8 Other case law and commentary 
The case of Ex Parte Master of the Supreme Court
67
 (discussed above under 
6.2.1 is an example of a lease of mineral rights being recognised as a 
registerable real right. In this case, the Court, in inquiring what the common-law 
meaning of the term “immovable property” is, considered whether the 
classification of things into immovable and movable property relates only to 
corporeal property. In this regard, the Court held that there are circumstances, 
such as insolvency, under which very important results might follow in respect 
of the classification of an incorporeal right as movable or immovable. The Court 
also considered that the 99 year leases were not merely registered against the 
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title deeds, but they were specially transferred by deed in the Register of Mining 
Rights. The court furthermore considered that the transfer of such leases is liable 
to transfer duty. The Court, therefore, concluded that the lease constituted 
‘immovable property’ by virtue of being a registerable real right.  
Other examples can be found in Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Oceana Development Investment Trust Plc.
68
 In this case, it was stated that  
“...whatever the precise juristic nature of mineral rights may be, there is 
also no doubt that that they are incorporeal rights relating to immovable 
property and hence must be regarded themselves as immovable 
incorporeal”.(emphasis added) 
Thus, mineral rights have been recognised as immovable property in the sense 
of an incorporeal right to the land to which the mineral relates. 
For example, a common-law prospecting contract coupled with an option either 
to purchase or lease the mineral rights in respect of which the prospecting 
contract was granted, constitutes a limited real right and is registerable in terms 
of the Deeds Registries Act. However, should the prospecting contract not come 
with an option to lease or purchase the mineral rights, there is authority in the 
Vansa Vanadium case
69
 that such a contract would not constitute a real right and 
also not be registerable. In reaching this conclusion, the court followed the 
views of several writers which held that that a prospecting contract which 
allowed the prospector to merely go onto the land and search for minerals was a 
personal right and not a real right. The court rejected the view of Franklin and 
Kaplan
70
, that the right to prospect on property amounts to a dimunition of or 
subtraction from the full dominium of the owner of the property and, therefore, 
constitutes a real right.  
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One of the important considerations which influenced the court to hold that the 
prospecting contract, which was the subject of the case, was not a real right was 
the fact that the contract could not be registered under the Deeds Registries Act 
and was not binding on successors in title.  
It follows that if a prospecting right (without an option to lease or purchase the 
mineral right) is a personal right and not a real right then it will also not be 
included in the concept of ‘immovable property’.  
According to van der Merwe,
71
 mineral rights are constituted by: 
 Reservation on registration of transfer of the property; 
 The cession of mineral rights by a notarial deed of cession; and 
 The owner obtaining a mineral right distinct from ownership.  




“Mineral rights are real rights of a unique kind which allow the holder to 
prospect for, extract and remove minerals on the land in question within 
the confines of legislation pertaining to mining and minerals. Ownership 
of the actual minerals is obtained only upon extraction and separation 
from the land. The mineral rights holder must act reasonably in exploiting 
the minerals, but in the case of irreconcilable conflict the mineral rights 
take precedence over the rights of the landowner”.  
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From the above, it is clear that our common-law principles regard a mineral 
right to be a registerable real right that could be characterised as (incorporeal) 
immovable property.  
The impact of this conclusion shows the conflict between the interpretation of 
the words ‘immovable property’ as used in paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule 
(ie that ‘immovable property’ is used in a corporeal sense only) and the 
common-law interpretation that ‘immovable property’ includes incorporeal 
rights.  
Interestingly, from the discussion in this chapter, a second conclusion may be 
drawn with regard to prospecting rights (without the option to lease or purchase 
the mineral right). This type of prospecting right is seen to be a personal right 
which could never qualify as immovable property. If this argument is to be 
followed then where 80 per cent or more of the market value of a company is 
attributed to a prospecting right (without the option to lease or purchase the 
mineral right), paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule potentially will not apply to 








7 Analysis of legal nature of mineral rights encompassed 
in mineral legislation 
7.1 Introduction 
As indicated in the previous chapter, it is clear that a mineral right (used as an 
all encompassing term for mining, prospecting, exploration and production 
rights) for common-law purposes is a real right that is characterised as 
incorporeal immovable property. For purposes of completeness, this chapter 
takes a look at the MPRDA, the currently prevailing legislation for the minerals 
industry and its predecessor, the 1991 Minerals Act to the establish if these 
pieces of legislation agree to the common-law principle relating to ‘immovable 
property’ and mineral rights (and therefore differ from the ITA interpretation 
thereof), 
7.2 Legal nature of mineral rights under the 1991 Minerals Act 
A ‘mineral’ was defined broadly in the 1991 Minerals Act as “any substance, 
whether in solid, liquid or gaseous form, occurring naturally in or on the earth 
in or under water or in tailings and having been formed by or subjected to a 
geological process, excluding water but including sand, stone, rock, gravel and 
clay, as well as soil, other than topsoil”.
73
  
A ‘mining right’ was defined in the 1991 Minerals Act to mean “any right or 
any share therein acquired under any section mentioned in section 47 (1) or (5) 
or any right to dig or to mine acquired under a tributing agreement as defined 
in section 1 of the Mining Titles Registration Act, 1967 (Act 16 of 1967), or any 
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Wallis J in the Agri SA SCA case explained that the 1991 Minerals Act was a 
policy of privatisation and deregulation announced in 1987. Section 5(1) of the 
1991 Minerals Act provided for the right to prospect and mine for and to dispose 
of minerals as follows: 
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, the holder of the right to any mineral in 
respect of land or tailings, as the case may be, or any person who has acquired 
the consent of such holder ... shall have the right to enter upon such land or the 
land on which such tailings are situated, as the case may be, together with such 
persons, plant or equipment as may be required for purposes of prospecting or 
mining and to prospect and mine for such mineral on or in such land or tailings, 
as the case may, and to  dispose thereof.”   
Although it appears that the State did not control the right to mine from a 
reading section 5(1) above, Wallis J iterates
75
 that a right to mine was conferred 
on the holders of such mineral rights subject to section 5(2) which exempted 
persons from the prospecting or mining for minerals without necessary 
authorisation granted in accordance with the Act. In this regard, the exercise of 
mineral rights, Wallis J argues was closely regulated in terms of the 1991 
Minerals Act and could not therefore be seen to have been a restoration of 
common-law rights to the holder.  
7.3 Legal nature of mineral rights under the MPRDA 
On 1 May 2004, the MPRDA heralded in a new dispensation which replaced 
that which had existed under the 1991 Minerals Act. The MPRDA vests the 
State with custodianship of South Africa’s mineral resources. In this regard, the 
preamble to the MPRDA states that “South Africa’s mineral and petroleum 
resources belong to the nation and that the State is the custodian thereof”.  
There is some academic debate that the principles enshrined in the 1991 
Minerals Act, relating to the private ownership of minerals that vested in the 
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landowner, were overthrown by the more public recognition that ownership of 
minerals vested in the people of the country. For the purposes of this document, 
it is not necessary to decide the validity of this argument. 
There was a transition period for a specified period of time, in terms of which 
the rights held by the landowner (referred to as “old order” rights) remained in 
force allowing the holder of such rights to apply for a mineral right in terms of 
the MPRDA. With the new dispensation, rights to minerals can only be 
transferred with the written approval from the Minister.  
Upon consideration of historic mining legislation in South Africa, it is clear that 
at all time, the State controlled the right to mine (ie it vested in the State) and 
that such rights are either exercised or allocated by the State. This was also the 
conclusion reached in the Agri SA SCA case (supra). 
Section 1 of the MPRDA defines a mineral as “any substance, whether in solid, 
liquid or gaseous form, occurring naturally in or on the earth or in or under 
water and which was formed by or subjected to a geological process, and 
includes sand, stone, rock, gravel, clay, soil and any mineral occurring in 
residue stockpiles or in residue deposits”. Expressly excluded from this 
definition, is “water, other than water taken from land or sea for extraction of 
any mineral from such water, petroleum or peat”. 
The following definitions, pertaining to the various types of rights that are 
granted in terms of the MPRDA, are set out below as well as salient features of 
the rights:   
1. In respect of mining activities: 
1.1 “mining right” means a right to mine granted in terms of section 
23(1) 
1.1.1 Section 23(1) provides that the Minister must grant a mining 
right to anyone if certain criteria are met;  
 
 




1.1.2 The mining right comes into effect on the date the 
environmental management programme is approved;
76
 and 
1.1.3 The mining right is valid for a period that is stipulated in the 
right and may not exceed 30 years.
77
 
1.2 “prospecting right” means a right granted in terms of section 17(1) 
1.2.1 Section 17(1) provides that the Minister must grant to 
anyone, a prospecting right, provided certain requirements are 
met; 
1.2.2 The prospecting right becomes effective on the date the 
environmental management programme is approved;
78
 and 
1.2.3 The prospecting right is valid for a period not exceeding five 
years and such period is specified in the right itself.  
2. In respect of oil and gas activities:  
2.1 “exploration right” means the right granted in terms of section 80 
2.1.1 An exclusive right is granted to the holder to explore for 
petroleum and right to produce same (for testing purposes); 
2.1.2 The Minister must grant the exploration right if certain 
requirements are met in terms of section 80(1) of the 
MPRDA; 
2.1.3 The exploration right provides the holder with an exclusive 
right to apply for the production right in respect of the 
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2.1.4 The exploration right is valid for three years initially80 and 
may be renewed for a maximum of three renewal periods 
consisting of a maximum of 2 years each
81
.   
2.2  “production right” means a right granted in terms of section 84 
2.2.1 A production right provides the holder with an exclusive right 
to produce petroleum; 
2.2.2 The Minister must grant a production right if certain 
requirements prescribed in section 84(1) are met; 
2.2.3 The production right becomes effective on the date on which 




2.2.4 The production right is valid for the period specified in the 
right and may last up to 30 years. The right may be renewed 
for a further term.
83
 
2.3 “reconnaissance permit” means a permit issued in terms of section 
75(1) 
2.3.1 A reconnaissance permit allows the holder to conduct 
speculative seismic or geochemistry surveys on a specific 
area; 
2.3.2 The Minister must issue a reconnaissance permit, in terms of 
section 75(1) if the prescribed criteria are met; and 
2.3.3 The reconnaissance permit is valid for a period not exceeding 
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2.4 “technical co-operation permit” means the technical co-operation 
permit issued in terms of section 77(1) 
2.4.1 A technical co-operation permit allows the holder to conduct 
an exclusive desk-top study of a specific area utilising 
existing data; 
2.4.2 The Minister must issue the technical co-operation permit, in 
terms of section 77(1) if the prescribed requirements are met; 
2.4.3 The technical co-operation permit is valid for a period not 




2.4.4 The holder of the technical co-operation permit has an 
exclusive right to apply for an exploration right in respect of 
which the technical co-operation permit relates to.
86
  
Section 5 of the MPRDA is titled “Legal Nature of Rights”. The section seeks to 
qualify the nature of a prospecting, mining, exploration and production right.  
It reads as follows: 
 “5(1) A prospecting right, mining right, exploration right or production 
right granted in terms of this Act is a limited real right in respect of the 
mineral or petroleum and the land to which such right relates. 
(2) The holder of a prospecting right, mining right, exploration right or 
production right is entitled to the rights referred to in this section and 
such other rights as may be granted to, acquired by or conferred upon 
such holder on this Act or any other law. 
(3) Subject to the Act, any holder of a prospecting right, mining right, 
exploration right or production right may:  
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(a) enter the land to which such right relates together with his or her 
employees, and may bring onto that land any plant, machinery or 
equipment and build, construct or lay down any surface, 
underground or under sea infrastructure which may be required for 
the purposes of prospecting, mining, exploration or production, as 
the case may be; 
(b) prospect, mine, explore or produce, as the case may be, for his 
or her own account on or under that land for the mineral or 
petroleum for which such right has been granted; 
(c) remove and dispose of any such mineral found during the course 
of prospecting, mining, exploration or production, as the case may 
be; 
(d) subject to the National Water Act, 1998 (Act No. 36 of 1998), use 
water from any natural spring, lake, river or stream, situated on, or 
flowing through, such land or from any excavation previously made 
and used for prospecting, mining, exploration or production 
purposes, or sink a well or borehole required for use relating to 
prospecting, mining, exploration or production on such land; and 
(e) carry out any other activity incidental to prospecting, mining, 
exploration or production operations, which activity does not 
contravene the provisions of this Act.”(emphasis added) 
Interestingly, section 5(1) seeks only to classify prospecting rights, mining 
rights, exploration rights and production rights as limited real rights. It does not 
seek to address the legal nature of the reconnaissance permit or the technical co-
operation permit. Arguably, these permits in the absence of a classification are 
not limited real rights.  
 
 




A common feature that may be derived from the definitions of the various 
mineral rights that may be granted in terms of the MPRDA is that upon the 
commencement of the MPRDA, mineral rights can be granted to anybody.  
Accordingly, it was found in the Agri SA SCA case that ‘the holding of mineral 
rights is no longer the gateway to the exploration of minerals and it is for that 
reason that the mineral rights have ceased to have value’
87
. Furthermore, due to 
the fact that a mineral right is merely an indication of ‘whom the legislature had 
chosen to bestow its gift’, it was found that this is regarded as a statutory right 
which does not constitute a property right.
88
 
A statutory right is not an asset which can be physically touched or seen. 
However, as a value can be attributed to such a right which the holder can enjoy, 
and the object to which the right is attached is property, a statutory right is a kin 
to an incorporeal right. From the a foregoing, it can be concluded that a mineral 
right granted in terms of the MPRDA constitutes a limited real right and is a 
subtraction from the rights of ownership of a landowner.  
7.4 Treatment of mineral rights in the ITA 
Having established that ‘immovable property’ in the ordinary sense includes 
incorporeal real rights and that the various rights granted in terms of the 
MPRDA are classified as limited real rights (and incorporeal in nature), it is 
necessary to analyse how the ITA classifies mineral rights throughout the 
statute, if at all.   
Section 1 of the ITA defines “mining operations” and “mining” to include 
“every method or process by which any mineral is won from the soil or from any 
substance or constituent thereof”. The term ‘mineral’ is not defined in the ITA.  
Whilst section 15 of the ITA provides for a deduction from income derived from 
mining operations of “an amount to be ascertained under the provisions of 
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section 36, in lieu of the allowances in section 11(e) …” and section 36 contains 
various ring-fencing provisions to determine the amount of capital expenditure 
that may be deducted by a taxpayer in terms of section 15, neither section 
defines a right in respect of mining.  
Section 37 of the ITA which deals with the calculation of capital expenditure on 
the sale, transfer, lease or cession of mining property, defines ‘mining property’ 
in terms of section 37(5) to mean “(a) any land on which mining is carried on; or 
(b) any right to minerals (including any right to mine for minerals) and a lease 
or sub-lease of such right.” (emphasis added).  
Interestingly, there was a need to distinguish in section 37 in defining “mining 
property” between land (corporeal) on which mining is carried on and a right 
(incorporeal) to minerals or to mine for minerals. A definition of ‘immovable 
property’ in the Eighth Schedule that includes both corporeal and incorporeal 
property could therefore be added as section 37 defines ‘mining property’ to cast 
aside any issues of interpretation.  
Section 26B of the ITA provides that the taxable income of any oil and gas 
company, as defined in the Tenth Schedule to the ITA shall be determined in 
accordance with the ITA but is subject to the provisions of the Tenth Schedule.  
Thus, the Tenth Schedule to the ITA sets out special rules that apply to the 
disposal of an oil and gas right by an “oil and gas company”, as defined.   
An “oil and gas company” is defined
89
 as any company –  
(a) that – 
 holds any oil and gas right; or 
 engages in exploration or production in terms of any oil and gas right. 
An “oil and gas right”
90
 means –  
                                                     
89 Paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule 
 
 




(a)  any reconnaissance permit, technical co-operation permit, exploration 
right, or production right as defined in section 1 of the MPRDA, or any 
right or interest therein; 
(b) any exploration right acquired by virtue of a conversion contemplated in 
item 4 of Schedule II to the MPRDA or any interest therein; or 
(c) any production right acquired by virtue of a conversion contemplated in 
item 5 of Schedule II to the MPRDA, or any interest therein. 
7.5 Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it can be summarised that mineral rights have been 
accepted as real rights and are recognised as incorporeal immovable property in 
terms of the MPRDA.   
However, to iterate with regard to a right to prospect (without the option to 
either lease or purchase the mineral right to which the right related to), such 
right is a personal right and can, therefore, not be recognised as immovable 
property as that term is normally understood. Further, the legal nature of 
reconnaissance permits and technical co-operation permits is questionable. This 
has not been examined further in this paper, except as to comment that should a 
non-resident company be disposing of its shares in an oil and gas company in 
South Africa, as defined in the Tenth Schedule and 80 per cent or more of the 
market value of that oil and gas company is attributable to a reconnaissance or 
technical co-operation permit, it is again arguable as in the case of the 
prospecting rights, that paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule as well as section 
35A of the ITA will not apply to such a transaction.  
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8 Double taxation and treaty relief 
8.1 Introduction 
The preamble to tax treaties (sometimes referred to as ‘conventions) usually 
states that they are entered into between countries “for the avoidance of double 
taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and 
capital gains”
91
. When a non-resident disposes of immovable property, that non-
resident may be subject to South African income tax on its South African 
sourced income as well as tax on the same amount in its country of residence. 
The non-resident would have at its disposal the application of a DTA which may 
remove or reduce South Africa’s right to tax the income realised on the sale of 
immovable property. 
8.2 Interpretational principles applicable to South African DTAs  
DTAs often refer to domestic legislation terms. Article 3(2) is an interpretational 
clause requiring use of the domestic term when the DTA term is not defined or 
the context of the term does not provide the necessary definition. Vogel
92
 
summaries three problems that may result from changes to domestic legislation 
referred to by an unchanged DTA as being: (a) the domestic law has been 
amended; (b) the domestic law carries the same meaning but with a different 
goal or objective; (c) the new domestic law contradicts the DTA. 
Given that South African DTAs are largely based on the OECD
93
 Model Tax 
Convention (OECD Model), this paper, whilst looking at the views of other 
authors, relies mainly on the OECD Commentary when interpreting the 
provisions of the DTA relating to immovable property. Furthermore, South 
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African case law supports the use of the OECD Commentary, albeit as a limited 
persuasive source of interpretation, when interpreting the provisions of DTAs 
that South Africa has concluded with other countries. 
South African DTAs concluded over the years have also reflected the changes 
made to the OECD Model from time to time. The OECD Model has also had a 
direct effect on South African domestic legislation. For instance, the definition 
of ‘permanent establishment’ in the South African ITA is a direct reference to 
the OECD Model Article 5 as determined from time to time. It is unclear 
whether this usage would permit the courts to seek guidance from the OECD 
Commentary in interpreting the definition. In SIR v Downing, reference was 
made to the lower courts usage of the OECD Commentary, however the judge 
did not place any reliance on the commentary in the determination of the 
judgment.  
That the South African treaties are largely based on the OECD Model may 
provide clarity on the status of the Commentaries to the OECD Model in the 
interpretation of South African DTAs. While the OECD Model has been used by 
South Africa over the years as a standard template for DTAs, South Africa is not 
a member of the OECD and has only recently achieved observer status. The use 
of the OECD Model by South Africa may also reflect the bargaining power of 
the other Contracting State, rather than a South African approach. Similarly, the 
South African tax treaty with the United States of America (USA) reflects more 
of the USA and United Nation (UN) Model Treaties than the OECD. Again, this 
may refer to the bargaining power of the other Contracting State. 
Other Model treaties such as the UN Model and the USA Model occasionally 
influence the South African negotiators. Generally speaking, the UN Model will 
have some effect on South African treaties with other African countries whereas 
the USA Model impact is reserved for negotiations with the USA.  
The impact that the commentaries to the UN Model will hold is submitted to be 
the same as that for the OECD Model. However, the USA Model is unlikely to 
 
 




be consulted for general interpretation of South African DTAs as only the USA-
South Africa DTA is based on the USA Model and supported by a USA 
Technical Explanation. 
The South African courts authority to decide matters involving South African 
DTAs is in terms of section 108 of the ITA. The section essentially provides that 
the National Executive may enter into agreement between South African and 
other countries “with a view to the prevention, mitigation or discontinuance of 
the levying, under the laws of the Republic and of such other country, of tax in 
respect of the same income, profits or gains, or tax imposed in respect of the 
same donation, or to the rendering of reciprocal assistance in the 
administration of and collection of the taxes under the said laws of the Republic 
and of such other country”. The DTAs acquire the force of law in South Africa 
in terms of section 231 of the Constitution
94
 after approval by Parliament and 
publication in the Government Gazette.
95
 Thus having acquired the force of law, 
DTAs are treated as equal to domestic tax legislation. This equal ranking can 
create potential difficulties if domestic legislation is in conflict with or is 
specifically legislated to override the treaty terms.  
8.3 Article 6 of the OECD Model 
Article 6 of the OECD Model deals with the taxing position in relation to 
income derived from immovable property. The Article reads as follows:  
1. Income derived by a resident of a Contracting State from immovable 
property (including income from agriculture or forestry) situated in the 
other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.  
2. The term ‘immovable property’ shall have the meaning which it has 
under the law of the Contracting State in which the property in question 
in situated. The term shall in any case include property accessory to 
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immovable property, livestock and equipment used in agriculture and 
forestry, rights to which the provisions of general law respecting landed 
property apply, usufruct of immovable property and rights to variable or 
fixed payments as consideration for the working of, or the right to work, 
mineral deposits, sources and other natural resources; ships, boats and 
aircrafts shall not be regarded as immovable property. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall apply to income derived from the 
direct use, letting, or use in any other form of immovable property. 
4. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3 shall also apply to the income from 
immovable property of an enterprise.  
Paragraph 1 gives the right to tax income from immovable property to the 
State of the source due to the fact that there is always a very close economic 
connection between the source of the income and the source State
96
. This is 
in line with the principle laid down in the Rhodesia Metals Case
97
. 
Article 6(2), which defines the term ‘immovable property’, states that the 
meaning which the term has under domestic law shall be ascribed to it for 
purposes of this provision. The reason for this attribution of definition is 
stated as follows in the OECD Commentary: 
“Defining the concept of immovable property by reference to the law of 
the State in which the property is situated, as is provided in paragraph 2, 
will help to avoid difficulties of interpretation over the question whether 
an asset or a right is to be regarded as immovable property or not. The 
paragraph, however, specifically mentions the assets and rights which 
must always be regarded as immovable property. In fact such assets and 
rights are already treated as immovable property according to the laws or 
the taxation rules of most OECD member countries. Conversely, the 
paragraph stipulates that ships, boats and aircraft shall never be 
                                                     








considered as immovable property. No special provision has been 
included as regards income from indebtedness secured by immovable 
property, as this question is settled in Article 11.” 
Vogel’s 
98
 interpretation of the term ‘law’ as used in Article 6(2) makes 
reference to the entire law rather than only tax law. The author goes further 
to state that if the private law of the State, in which the immovable property 
is situated, attributes a meaning to that term which differs from the meaning 
it has under tax law, then the meaning it has under tax law shall prevail.
99
  
As discussed in previous chapters, the term ‘immovable property’ itself is 
not defined in the ITA, either generally or specifically. Paragraph 2(2) of the 
Eighth Schedule to the ITA, however, defines an ‘interest in immovable 
property’. Olivier and Honiball
100
 consider such definition to not be of 
general application but merely applicable for CGT purposes.  
Vogel
101
 states that according to the second sentence of Article 6(2), the 
term ‘immovable property’ in any case includes rights to which the 
provisions of general law respecting landed property apply. This involves 
corporeal rights in land treated as rights in real property, hereditary 
leaseholds and mining rights.  
Whilst Article 6(2) defines the term ‘immovable property’, Olivier and 
Honiball
102
  argue that it does not deal with the problem where only one of 
the Contracting States regards the property as immovable property. The 
authors argue further that the article also gives no guidance on the rules to be 
followed to determine where the immovable property is situated.  
Article 6(3) clearly sets out to cover income from the direct use, letting or 
use in any other form of immovable property, in other words, income from 
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the exploitation of the land and not, for example, income derived from the 
disposal of the land.
103
 Thus, in the case of income derived from the 
exploitation of natural resources, it is clear that Article 6 applies.  
In the context of South Africa’s rich mineral history and extensive energy 
and natural resources sector, Olivier and Honiball
104
  state that it is clearly 
beneficial for South Africa to have mining rights as well as mining activities 
categorised as immovable property as the State in which the mine is situated 
has the right to tax the income derived from the sale of such immovable 
property. In the absence of such an inclusion, the authors surmise that the 
income will have to be dealt with under another article, citing Article 12 
(which deals with the taxing right of royalties) as an example. This will, the 
authors conclude, result in the State of residence having the exclusive right 
to tax the income arising from such activities. 
8.4 Article 13 of the OECD Model 
Article 13 of the OECD Model deals with the taxing position in relation to 
capital gains that arise from the alienation of, inter alia, immovable property. 
Article 13 reads as follows:  
1. Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of 
immovable property referred to in Article 6 and situated in the other 
Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. 
2. Gains from the alienation of movable property forming part of the 
business property of a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a 
Contracting State has in the other Contracting State, including such gains 
from the alienation of such a permanent establishment (alone or with the 
whole enterprise), may be taxed in that other State. 
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3. Gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft operated in international 
traffic boats engaged in inland waterways transport or movable property 
pertaining to the operation of such ships, aircraft or boats, shall be 
taxable only in the Contracting State in which the place of effective 
management of the enterprise is situated. 
4. Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of 
shares deriving more than 50 per cent of their value directly or indirectly 
from immovable property situated in the other Contracting State may be 
taxed in that other State.  
5. Gains from the alienation of any property, other than that referred to in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of 
which the alienator is a resident. 
Article 13(1) clearly provides the taxing right of the capital gain to the State 
which, prior to the alienation of immovable property disposed of, was 
entitled to tax both such property and the income derived wherefrom.
105
In 
other words, with regard to immovable property, the source State has prior 
right tax the capital gain arising from the alienation thereof.  
The OECD Commentary
106
 sets out, as a foreword to its commentary on 
Article 13, that it is left to the domestic law of each Contracting State to 
decide whether capital gains should be taxed, and if they are taxable, how 
they are to be taxed. For instance, under domestic law, a percentage of 
capital gains is included in a taxpayer’s income and then taxed at the 
ordinary income tax rates.
107
 In this regard, it must be noted that section 35A 
is considered to be an advanced payment of the capital gains tax payable by 
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the non-resident on the disposal of immovable property, despite no express 
mention of CGT in section 35A itself.
108
  
Thus, it is Article 13 which will either remove or reduce South Africa’s 
taxing right to the capital gain resulting from the disposal of shares in a 
mineral company.  
In the context of defining ‘immovable property’, especially for purposes of 
applying DTA relief, Olivier and Honiball
109
 cite the Australian case of FCT 
v Lamesa Holdings BV 97 ATC 4752.
110
 Whilst this is not a South African 
case, the authors believe that the judgement provides an indication of what 
constitutes immovable property and would therefore be persuasive authority 
in South Africa.  
The facts were briefly that the taxpayer, a resident of the Netherlands, sold 
shares in an Australian company which in turn held shares in another 
Australian company which owned gold mining leases. The question before 
the Court was whether the disposal by Lamesa resulted in a disposal of the 
mining leases. If so, then the income from the disposal of the shares had to 
be dealt with under the capital gains tax article in the Netherlands / Australia 
DTA. The relevant article provided for the taxation of income from ‘real 
property’. The term ‘real property’ was defined to include “shares or 
comparable interest in a company, the assets of which consist wholly or 
principally of direct interest in or over land in one of the States or rights to 
exploit or to explore for, natural resources in one of the States”. The 
taxpayer argued that only where the interest is held directly by the alienator 
the capital gains article will be applicable and not where the interest is held 
by another company in which the alienator holds shares. The Court agreed. 
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The case has since been viewed upon favourably by treaty negotiators 
looking to extend Article 13 to target interests in interposed companies.  
Olivier and Honiball
111
 cite that application of the deeming provision in 
paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA may be problematic in a 
treaty context. The question the authors pose is whether the reclassification 
of the income for domestic law purposes will override the right to which a 
particular State has under a treaty to tax the income either as business profits 
or as other income.  
8.5 Interplay between Articles 6 and 13 and the domestic legislation 
As has been discussed earlier, there is no definition of ‘immovable property’ in 
the South African tax legislation, save for the definition of ‘interest in 
immovable property’ for CGT purposes. As has been argued, the reference to 
‘immovable property’ in paragraph 2 is problematic as it appears to refer to 
corporeal property only. Thus, where an ‘interest in immovable property’, ie 
shares in property-rich South African company are disposed of, paragraph 2 of 
the ITA may not apply if 80 per cent of more of the value of such shares is 
attributable to a mineral right (ie incorporeal property). Thus, any gain realised 
on those shares would not be treated as income arising from the disposal of 
immovable property under the tax legislation. Accordingly, Article 6 of the 
DTA would not be applicable.  
From an interpretation perspective, Article 6(2) includes a mineral right in the 
meaning it ascribes to ‘immovable property’. This, again, is in conflict with the 
manner in which paragraph 2 seeks to define ‘immovable property’ for domestic 
tax purposes.  
Under Article 13(4), the source State may tax capital gains arising from the 
alienation of shares deriving more than 50% of their value directly from 
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immovable property situated in the Source State. Article 13(4) applies ordinarily 
where the non-resident company disposing of their shares in a South African 
property-rich company is taxed on the capital gain to provide South Africa with 
sole taxing right to such income. However, if no CGT would apply to this 
transaction on the basis of the argument put forward in 5.1.2, Article 13(4) 
would not find application and it would be the State in which the company 
disposing of the shares is resident that will have taxing rights to the income.  
8.6 International tax cases 
In the Vanenburg
112
 case, the issue before the courts in Hyderabad, India was 
whether shares in the Indian company were ‘immovable property’ for purposes 
of applying section 13(1) of the DTA between India and Netherlands to the gain 
realised from the alienation thereof. The taxpayer, a Dutch company named 
Vanenburg Facilities B.V., invested in the equity shares of an Indian company, 
namely, Vanenburg IT Park Private Limited. The Indian company was engaged 
in the business of developing, operating and maintain infrastructure facilities of 
an industrial park. During the 2005 to 2006 years of assessment, the Dutch 
company sold its 100 per cent shareholding in the Indian company to a non-
resident of India. With regard to the withholding taxes, appropriate taxes were 
withheld by the buyer before making payment of the sale consideration 
(including interest on the delayed payment thereof). 
The Dutch company claimed, as a refund, the taxes so withheld by the buyer 
when filing its tax return on the basis that the capital gains were not taxable in 
India in terms of the India-Netherland DTA. The Indian Tax Officer cited 
domestic tax legislation, in terms of which the shares of the Indian company 
were defined as ‘immovable property’. Accordingly, the Indian revenue 
authorities sought to tax the gains arising from the alienation of immovable 
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property under Article 13(1) of the India-Netherland DTA. On appeal, the 
Indian Tax Officer’s case was upheld.  
It was then brought before the Hyderabad Tribunal (an equivalent to the South 
African High Court). The Court observed that Article 13(1) of the India-
Netherland DTA provided the taxing right to India on gains derived by the 
Dutch company from the alienation of ‘immovable property’ referred to in 
Article 6 and situated in India. As per Article 6(2) of the India-Netherland DTA, 
the term ‘immovable property’, bears the meaning it has under the domestic tax 
law of India.  
On an analysis of the domestic tax provisions, it was found that the term 
‘immovable property’ was not defined generally in the Act. Where the term was 
defined, it was for specific purposes and had restricted applicability. It was also 
found that the term, where defined in more than one place in the legislation, had 
variances to the definition provided for specific purposes and concluded that the 
specific definition could not be used for general purposes under the legislation. 
The Court also took into consideration the definition of ‘immovable property’ 
under other Acts pertaining to property and found that whilst immovable 
property included land, buildings or any rights pertaining thereto, it did not 
include shares in a company.  
Since the Dutch company was not sold any immovable property or, more 
importantly, any rights directly attached to the immovable property, Article 
13(1) of the India-Netherland DTA could not be applied to the disposal of 
shares. Article 13(4), being the specific provision in the DTA dealing with the 
sale of shares, was also found not be applicable since the assets of the Indian, 
which actually is immovable property, remained in the business of the Indian 
company. Since neither Article 13(1) nor Article 13(4) of the India-Netherland 
DTA applied, the capital gains arising on the transfer of shares was found not to 
be taxable in India. The capital gain would, in fact, only be taxable in 
Netherlands under Article 13(5) of the India-Netherlands DTA. 
 
 




This case has outlined the circumstances under which the interpretation of words 
defined for specific purposes in relation to a general definition under the tax Act 
will be considered. Interestingly, it was also held that as the income was not 
liable to be taxed in India, Indian transfer pricing rules did not apply to the 
transaction which happened between two non-residents. In addition, as the 
income was not liable to be taxed in India, there was no obligation on the 
purchaser to withhold tax at the source under the relevant domestic tax 
legislation. However, even though the resulting tax liability was nil for the 
Dutch company, it still had to file a return since it was liable to tax in India but 
by virtue of a treaty.  
The problem of valuing assets in mining companies was shown in the recent 
case of Resource Capital Fund III LP v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCA 
363. 
Resource Capital Fund (RCF), a non-resident of Australia, disposed of its shares 
in an Australian mining company in 2007. The Australian revenue authorities 
sought to tax the transaction on the basis that the capital gain from the disposal 
of shares was subject to CGT in Australia (South Africa and Australia’s 
domestic tax legislation is similar in this regard). One of the issues was whether 
any capital gain could be disregarded on the basis that the market value of the 
mining company’s “taxable Australian real property” (TARP) did not exceed the 
sum of the market value of the mining company’s non-TARP assets.  
Whilst in South Africa, the 80 per cent market value test is in respect of all 
assets to determine whether CGT is applicable to the above transaction, the test 
under Australian domestic law requires a separate determination of the market 
value of each of the company’s assets.  
This case is mentioned here as it provides insight when considering whether a 
company is a property-rich company or not, whether for domestic tax law 
purposes or application of a tax treaty that much may depend on the market 
value methodology that is applied. 
 
 





Article 13 speaks of gains realised from the alienation of ‘immovable property’. 
Those words, in turn, are defined for purposes of the tax treaty in Article 6(2) to 
include mineral rights. This does not agree to the meaning that paragraph 2 of 
the Eighth Schedule seeks to ascribe to ‘immovable property’ for domestic tax 
purposes.  
It would favour South Africa to have the common-law interpretation of 
‘immovable property’ apply to a mineral right (ie to confirm in legislation that 
the incorporeal right is ‘immovable property’) since Article 13(4) provides full 
taxing rights of the capital gain realised on the disposal of shares where 50% or 
more of the value of the shares is attributable to immovable property in South 
Africa. 
As the Vanenburg case shows, the courts will look to the domestic legislation 
for the meaning of the words ‘immovable property’. If none is found or if it is 
found, but is defined specifically with restrictive application or variance in 
meaning, the Court will consider other pieces of legislation to come to its 
decision. However, if one keeps in mind Vogel’s comment that if the private law 
of a State in which immovable property is situated attributes a meaning to a term 
that differs from the meaning it has under tax law, the meaning under the tax 
law prevails.  
Having shown the conflict between the meaning ascribed to ‘immovable 
property’ in terms of our common-law and tax law in previous chapters, it is 
quite possible based on Vogel’s argument that the meaning under the tax law 
prevails for tax treaty purposes, (in this instance that a mineral right is not 
‘immovable property’ as set out in paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the 
ITA) that even if SARS argues that a non-resident is subject to CGT on the 
transaction involving a sale of shares in a mineral company in South Africa, a 
tax treaty could well take away South Africa’s taxing right. 
 
 





Paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule subjects non-residents to CGT on the 
disposal of ‘immovable property’ situated in South Africa, which definition 
includes shares held in a company where 80 per cent or more of the market 
value of those shares is attributable to immovable property and at least 20 per 
cent of the share capital is held by that non-resident.  
Whilst it is established n common-law and in the MPRDA that mineral rights 
(encompassing mining, prospecting, exploration and production rights) are real 
rights of an incorporeal nature and therefore ‘immovable property’ and the DTA 
includes mineral rights in the definition of ‘immovable property’ in Article 6(2), 
the conclusion that mineral rights constitute ‘immovable property’ in the Eighth 
Schedule should not be assumed and bears scrutiny. Thus, with reference to the 
key question posed in this paper, one could respond simplistically to say that a 
mineral right is not ‘immovable property’ for purposes of South African tax but 
is ‘immovable property’ for purposes of DTAs. 
Even though, it could be argued that a mineral right could constitute an ‘asset’ 
as defined in the Eighth Schedule, since incorporeal property is included in the 
definition of ‘asset’, one cannot ascribe the incorporeal nature of a mineral right 
to the words ‘immovable property’ as those words are currently used in the 
Eighth Schedule. As argued, paragraph 2 is absurd in its structure and can only 
be interpreted to mean that ‘immovable property’ refers to corporeal property 
each time it is used in that paragraph and that an ‘interest to immovable 
property’ would therefore refer to an interest in land as opposed to an interest in 
a mineral right.   
The recommendation is that it would be in the best interests of the fiscus for the 
legislators to include a specific definition of ‘immovable property’ that is clear 
and unambiguous in its meaning so as to include incorporeal real rights such as 
 
 




mineral rights in the ITA, as is the case with the definition of ‘mining property’ 
in section 37 of the ITA.  
This would have a two-fold effect (i) there would be certainty on the tax 
treatment for foreign investors when divesting of their mineral assets in South 
Africa and (ii) the fiscus would not be jeopardised if a non-resident company 
divests it South African mineral assets without paying taxes. 
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